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SUGGESTED INITIAL PROJECTS FOR PSB

I. Psychological Strategy in the cold war

Many individuals working in the field of psychological operations in the cold war have felt the absence of a "grand-strategy" -- a set of objectives toward the attainment of which all efforts can be directed. One cannot be so sanguine as to hope that such a strategy can be clearly outlined by any one agency or in a short period of time. Furthermore, it is a matter which clearly goes far beyond the competence of psychological operations specialists. These difficulties, however, do not excuse psychological operations planners from making what contribution they can toward the grand strategy, and the establishment of a Psychological Strategy Board gives them a better opportunity of doing so than they have had heretofore. It is believed, therefore, that one of the first tasks of the new board should be to set in motion a major effort to formulate a broad, worldwide psychological strategy for the cold war.

A suggested procedure for accomplishing this is as follows:

1. Appointment of a working group composed of the nation's very best brains in the field of psychological operations and making provision to see that they have facilities for concentrated work.

Some such membership as the following is suggested. Since it is not possible to be sure that the individuals named will be able to serve, this list represents more the type of composition recommended, rather than the actual composition.

Mr. Alfred Loomis, Chairman
 Dr. Philip Mosley
 Admiral Stevens
 General Magruder
 General McClure
 Mr. Edward Barrett
 Mr. Paul Nitze
 Mr. Joseph Phillips
 Dr. Hans Speier
 Mr. C. D. Jackson
 Mr. George Kennan
 Mr. Wallace Carroll
 Dr. Bernard Brodie
 Mr. W. J. ...
 Gen. Donovan

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2. A working place outside Washington should be designated for meetings. It has been noted in previous similar cases that it is much simpler to enable top quality men to work on problems of this sort personally (rather than delegating them to subordinates) if they can be insulated from the pressure of routine duties. This insulation procedure is commonly adopted by such agencies as Brookings and RAND with a considerable measure of success.
3. The group should be asked to work on such very broad problems as the following:
 - a. What psychological and other measures can be taken to restrain Soviet aggression?
 - b. What psychological and other measures can be taken to strengthen our allies and potential allies?
 - c. How may the best statement of U. S. ideology be arrived at?
 - d. How can our cold war aims be defined?
4. The temporary staff of the PSB should be asked to take the following measures in preparation for this working group:
 - a. Make necessary arrangements for meeting place, secretarial help, security, etc.
 - b. Prepare briefing papers. (For example, an analysis of NSC papers and Presidential statements having a bearing on psychological operations.)
 - c. Arrange for oral briefings by governmental experts, as needed.
5. The full group should be asked to meet for a three or four day period at the beginning of the summer and for a three or four day period toward the end of the summer. In between the two full meetings sub-groups should be asked to work on specific phases of the over-all problem.
6. It should be emphasized that this is not to be viewed as an effort to work out a national policy binding on all agencies. It is rather an attempt to answer two questions:

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- a. From the point of view of psychological operations, what should our national policy be?
- b. How may existing national policy be exploited more effectively through psychological operations?

II. A Long-term Campaign to Improve the Personnel Situation in Psychological Operations

This campaign might be divided into two parts: (1) an effort to improve and coordinate training programs, and (2) an effort to induce superior personnel who already have the available qualifications to enter government service in the field of psychological operations. A considerable amount of basic work on the first part has already been accomplished, but coordination is still lacking. An approach to the second part might be as follows:

- (1) Ascertain through interviews with leading experts outside the government what their principal objections to entering government service are.
- (2) Work out with all agencies affected a long-term publicity program designed to attract first-rate personnel.
- (3) Approach key members of Congress with a view to obtaining their support in this campaign.

III. Implementation of Project [REDACTED] Report.

1. Iran

Appoint an ad hoc working group to develop an emergency overt and covert psychological warfare plan for Iran. This group would frankly be experimental -- i.e. its purpose would be to see how much more could be done in Iran than is being done at the present time. The suggested composition of this group would be along the following lines:

Mr. S. Sheppard Jones, Chairman
One or two former Service Attaches from Iran
An expert on covert activities in Iran
Dr. Philip K. Hitti, if cleared.

V. Policy Planning and Research Survey

This survey, which would be undertaken primarily by the temporary PSB with outside advice solicited as needed, should attempt to answer the following questions:

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1. What policy planning for the cold war and hot war in the field of psychological operations is currently going on?
2. What basic research for psychological operations in the cold war and hot war is currently going on?
3. What additional planning and research is needed, and what agencies should undertake it?

VI. Survey of Evaluation Activities

This survey should be undertaken along the same lines as the above.

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THE NEW "COLD WAR" STRATEGY BOARD CREATED MORE THAN SIX WEEKS AGO
TO EXPAND THE NATION'S FOREIGN PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE ACTIVITIES HAS
NOT BEGUN FUNCTIONING YET.

THE BOARD STILL NEEDS A DIRECTOR. IT HAS NOT YET HELD ITS FIRST
MEETING, IT WAS LEARNED.

MARK ETHRIDGE, PUBLISHER OF THE LOUISVILLE, KY., COURIER-JOURNAL
& TIMES CO., TURNED DOWN PRESIDENT TRUMAN'S REQUEST THAT HE HEAD THE
BOARD.

OFFICIALS SAID ALLEN W. DULLES, ONE OF THE TOP AUTHORITIES IN THE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, ALSO HAD TURNED DOWN THE JOB. DULLES, A
BROTHER OF SPECIAL AMBASSADOR JOHN FOSTER DULLES, AGREED, HOWEVER, TO
HELP ORGANIZE THE BOARD PENDING APPOINTMENT OF A DIRECTOR.

THE NEW GROUP WOULD SUCCEED A NATIONAL PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE BOARD
COMPOSED OF STATE, DEFENSE, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF AND CIA REPRESENTA-
TIVES. THIS BOARD, UNDER DIRECTION OF ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
STATE EDWARD W. BARRETT, WAS APPOINTED LAST AUGUST TO SPEED UP
PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE OPERATIONS.

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